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Abstract
Throughout the whole Qing Dynasty, there had been 
great twists and changes of the bureaucratization of 
native officers in Guizhou area—with the changes in 
military and political situations, it had gone through 
several different policy periods of appeasement in 
Shunzhi period, the active flow-changing of Wu Sangui, 
resumption of conciliatory policy in Kangxi period, 
the comprehensive and all-dimensional native officers 
bureaucratization in Yongzheng period and the policy 
rehabilitation of Koreans, Miao nationalities and frontier 
in Qing Dynasty. As the important strategic pivot, the 
policy changes of bureaucratization of native officers in 
Guizhou stands for an epitome for the minority policy 
at boarders under the domination of central regime for 
the great unity, the changing reasons of which are not 
only closely related with the objective military and 
political situations, but also related with the ruling styles 
of the emperors themselves. The national strategies of 
the mainland-frontier integration of Qing Dynasty were 
constant; the phased policy changes of bureaucratization 
of native officers were only different in manners and 
measures. It is just in this phased changes and gradually 
forwarding process that the bureaucratization of Guizhou 
realized the general goal of matching politics, economics 
and culture with the mainland.
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INTRODUCTION
From Ming Dynasty, the Chieftain system fell into 
serious conflicts with the central government, making 
the bureaucratization of native officers the objective 
requirement of the central government under great unity. 
The chieftains in Guizhou enjoyed great power and 
strength, so the process of bureaucratization was the most 
twisted one: the three climaxes in Guizhou—abolishing 
two Pacification Offices in Sizhou and Sinan during the 
reign of Yongle, calming down the Pacification Office 
in Bozhou during the reign of Wanli and abolishing 
Song Chieftain at the east bank of the local river during 
the reign of Chongzhen, which abolished three of the 
four Chieftains (Tian,Yang, An and Song); the regional 
bureaucratization of native officers during the years of 
Longqing and Zhengtong had abolished some chiefs, 
pacification officers and chieftains, some of which were 
changed into counties and some were under the control of 
prefectures and weisuo though reserving the Chieftains 
system. Although the An Chieftain was still in Xuanwei 
Pacification Office at the west bank of the local river, 
his power was greatly undermined. Except the original 
territory (Miao Territory) in Guizhou, other chieftains 
were not powerful enough to contend with the central 
government, which also laid the foundation for the large-
scaled and full-dimensional bureaucratization of officers 
in Qing Dynasty.
After the forces of Qing Dynasty entering Guizhou, the 
process of bureaucratization of native officers in Guizhou 
can be classified into five phases.
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1.  THE CONCILIATORY POLICY IN 
EARLY SHUNZHI PERIOD
In late Ming and early Qing Dynasties, several political 
forces in Guizhou intertwined. 16 years ago in Shunzhi 
period, the current Guizhou region served as the frontiers 
fighting against Qing forces of Li Dingguo and Sun 
Kewang in Daxi military under the regime of Yongli in 
Southern Ming Dynasty. In the cruel military battles, the 
conciliatory policy had been unanimously adopted no 
matter for Li Dingguo  or other subordinated Manchu 
nobility. On 19th January 1659 of Shunzhi period, the 
imperial edict for Doni, General of Anyuanjingkou, Wu 
Sangui, General of Pingxi and Zhao Butai, General of 
Zhengnan read like:
The south has not been pacified, so I specially appoint you to 
crusade Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan, etc.. All the 
chieftains and people there are my subjects and civilians. Since 
the insurgences of the invaders, you are afflicted; I feel pity 
on. Now that the military is dispatched there, conciliate those 
who want to come over and never offend their belongings; 
at the same time, tell soldiers not to plunder; those who have 
contributed must get rewarded by money of official positions. 
You can copy theses edicts and disseminate so that the chieftains 
and civilians fully understand my order.1
On 21st January 1659 in Shunzhi period, Hong 
Chengchou, great secretary for operation had reported to 
the court:
An Kun, pacification superintendent of Shuixi had 
surrendered; refer to the attached version.2
On 11th August 1659 in Shunzhi period, Wu Sangui 
reported again that An Zhongsheng, Wusa local military 
and civilian government as well as Tao Dou, Jingdong 
local government in Yunnan.3
On 16th September 1659 in Shunzhi period, he ordered 
the native officials to report the pedigree, record and 
the number of offspring for registration with the Chief 
Secretary, which would be reported to the court for 
auditing.4
For the Qing government at this period, it didn’t fulfill 
the national unity for its main rival was the Yongli regime 
of South Ming. After weighing the priorities, it was 
necessary to treat the native official in a moderate way: 
They would be given preferential treatment only they 
would surrender. This was also determined by the political 
and military situations at that time.
1 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizu’s Veritable Records 
Book 122,  pp.15-16.
2 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizu’s Veritable Records 
Book 122,  p.16.
3 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizu’s Veritable Records 
Book 126,  p.22.
4 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizu’s Veritable Records 
Book 27,  p.11.
2.  FLOW CHANGING OF SHUIXI BY WU 
SANGUI
On 25th January 1659 of Shunzhi period, Wu entered 
Kunming and emperor Yongli fled toward Yongchang 
and exiled to Myanmar, so Qing army quickly occupied 
the whole province of Yunnan. However, the generals 
of South Ming like Li Dingguo and Bai Wenxuan still 
owned some forces at that time; the native officials in 
Yunnan and Guizhou appeared to surrender, but plotted 
with Yongli and adopted a watch-and-see attitude. 
In order to stabilize Yunnan and Guizhou as soon as 
possible, on 22th October 1659, Shunzhi issued an edict 
to the Ministry of Official Personal Affairs and Ministry 
of War to order Wu Sangui suppress Yunnan. All the 
civil or military officials, whether sagacious or not, 
were chosen and impeached; the right and errors in civil 
society were upheld or eradicated in reforms; all the 
affairs related with militants, horses, money and food 
were be managed by the vessel state. On 22nd December 
1661, Qing government ordered Wu again to manage all 
kinds of affairs of civil and military affairs based on the 
regulations of Yunnan. Up till then, Wu was placed on 
the political stage of southwestern regions in turmoils, 
becoming the master of this region. After controlling 
this area, Wu immediately began the bureaucratization 
movement of the native officials.
A t  t h i s  t i m e ,  W u  h a d  i m p l e m e n t e d  t h e 
bureaucratization of native officials in Shuixi, Manai, 
Wusa and other regions in Guizhou; There are three 
reasons for it:
Firstly, eradicate the residual forces of chieftains left 
from Ming Dynasty. Qing had eradicated the hidden 
hazards to prevent Li Dingguo and his subjects from 
launching accidents.
After the Qing army entering Yunnan, the stability 
of Yunnan and Guizhou depended on the forces of the 
chieftains. The residue of the bureaucratization of native 
officials in Ming Dynasty—An family in Shuixi—had 
gained rather considerable forces. Under the strategies 
of “not sparing to offer high positions and money for 
encouragement”5 to the surrendered chieftains, An Kun 
had surrendered, becoming the pacification superintendent 
in a justifiable way. At this time, the fast developing 
Pumingsheng, chieftain of Amizhou and Sha Yuan, 
Chieftain of Annan had returned fast and was given 
official position for hereditary. However, the surrender 
of the chieftains was forced by the strong Qing army. 
The unstable situations in southwestern regions had 
made these two chieftains harbor evil plans, so there 
were upheavals at any time. An Kun, chieftain of Shuixi 
saw that “the national military had not fully stationed 
here, and their forces were weak, so he had planned 
5 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizu’s Veritable Records 
Book 122, p.15.
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something”.6 In particular, chieftain She An and chieftain 
Shapu had a history of starting the rebellion during the 
reign of Chongzhen; in addition, the forces of Li Dingguo 
had not fully been eradicated and dominated the border 
between China and Myanmar. The chieftain forces and 
the residual forces from South Ming Dynasty had echoed 
with each other, so there was a great possibility that they 
would coordinate, which would pose a great threat to 
Qing Dynasty. For example, Lv Hongyang, subordinate 
of Zheng Chenggong, hid in Shuixi so as to launch an 
upheaval so as to respond to Li Dingguo. When An 
Qing fought against Qing, he also held the banner of Li 
Dingguo, Emperor Jin of South Ming. Under this kind of 
situation, Wu Sangui continued to chase after the residues 
of Li Dingguo and Yongli Emperor; on the other hand, he 
began a large-scaled bureaucratization of native officers in 
Shuixi, etc..
Secondly, ensure the smoothness of the channel to 
Yunnan. Guizhou is important in geographical location, 
leading to the strategic channel of Yunnan. A large 
dispatch of militants in southwest posed a great problem 
of food in the background. When Hong Chengchou led 
three military troops to Yunnan, he worried that “when 
they step on Guizhou, the Miao people would intercept at 
the mountain, or break the way or prevent us from going 
ahead, so we don’t have enough food for them.” If we 
dispatch a few militants, we may be raided by the local 
people, so it is easy to fall into a dilemma,7 which made it 
difficult to transfer food. The latter situations proved what 
Hong Chengchou said. In 1st month of lunar calendar of 
Shunzhi period, Bian Sanyuan said:
Guizhou province played an important role, which really 
stands for the key convergent road of five provinces. It goes 
with the trend that food and reimbursement all go to that place; 
besides, the famish of that year makes miscreants of Miao 
revolt. Huangsi of Pingyue office had been robbed of food and 
other perks; at the same time, the road to the mountains were 
frequently plundered.8
That is to say that there was food plundering from 
Miao people around Huangsiduo region. Under this 
kind of situation, it was imperative to ensure the smooth 
transportation of the courier route so as to ensure the 
ample food for soldiers and the security logistics. 
Therefore, Wu Sangui needed to firstly wipe out the 
obstacles from a chieftain, chieftain from Wusa and 
chieftain from Manai. On 2nd August 1660 in Shunzhi 
period, Wu Sangui reported to the court:
An Kun has been plotting for a long time. He heard that the 
recent punishment would sacrifice for the ghost to stage 
revolt. Considering that Shuixi and Manai as the key road of 
6 Notice of Bian Sanyuan-the Governor of Guizhou, Historycal 
Documents of Ming and Qing Dynasties series A, Book. 5
7 Secret Notice of Hong Chengchou-A High Offical, Historycal 
Documents of Ming and Qing Dynasties, series A, Book. 6
8 Notice of Bian Sanyuan-the Governor of Guizhou, Historical 
Documents of Ming and Qing Dynasties, series C, Book 10.
military, so they allowed no blocking. Adopting the preemptive 
strategy, the subject had better suppress as early as possible so 
as to wipe away the hidden danger of Qing Dynasty. What’s 
more, AnZhong, chieftain of Wusa harbored evil intents, so it 
was better to suppress them to spread the national greatness. 
Therefore, they got the edict: councilor, beyle (a rank of the 
Manchu nobility below that of the prince) and subjects come 
soon for discussion.9
On 8th November 1660 in Shunzhi period, the political 
subjects replied Wu Sangui:
An Kun, chieftain of Shuixi, Long Jizhao, chieftain of Manai 
and An Zhongsheng, etc have obeyed on appearance but plotted 
in the dark. Manage according to request: Carefully plotting and 
destroying them by waiting for the right moment.10
Thirdly, realize the political ambition of Wu Sangui 
of being the king in the southwest. Wu Sangui had been 
proved to be a speculator in the political stage at the end 
of Ming and in early Qing Dynasty. After Wu surrendering 
to Qing government, he had full knowledge of the 
historical experience of the outcome of last struggling 
in the process of chasing Yongli emperor of South Ming 
Dynasty. He knew that the Qing government would not 
fully trust him, so he actively surrenders and absorbs the 
rebellions to expand his forces; on the other hand, he 
also sought to protect himself. Therefore, Wu had begged 
Hong Chengchou as follows:
Sangui asked about the self-consolidating strategy; Chengchou 
said: Do not make middle of Yunnan free from troubles. Sangui 
bears that in mind.11
The emperor can’t bear to have another king to 
be around him, therefore, the existence of chieftains 
posed a great threat and obstacle. In order to dominate 
southwest, fight for the advantages bargaining with Qing 
royal court and realize its largest political interests, the 
bureaucratization also served as the necessary steps for 
Wu Sangui to realize his dream of “being the king in 
southwest”. Although these had done some derailments, 
Wu Sangui made a fuss about them, which served as 
the important factors of exacerbating the situations. On 
7th Januay 1683, Cai Yurong, general superintend had 
reported the matter of chieftains, which goes like:
The hereditary matters of chieftains sound plausible. In the past 
when Wu did not stage a revolt, he harbored hatred to suppress 
Shuixi and annihilate An Kun. His wife had fled to Wumeng 
with rest of his subjects and later gave birth to An Shizong, 
who is still young now. I can observe the differences between 
people in Pingyue, Qianxi, Weining and Dading. Chieftain 
demonstrating has made it convenient.12
9 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizu’s Veritable Records 
Book 139,  p.22.
10 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizu’s Veritable Records 
Book 141, p.3.
11 Cangbianshanqiao: Wu Sangui Die for Rebellion.
12 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shengzu’s Veritable Records 
Book 106, pp.18-19.
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Fouthly, amass the finances and military forces for 
anti-Qing movement.
(Sangui) took the initiative to suppress the revolts by the 
chieftains of Shuixi. On appearance, he pioneered the land; but 
he employed these advantages for his own good.13
Kangxi also said when recalling the affairs of the 
chieftain in Shuixi:
During the reign of Shunzhi, Li Dingguo safeguarded the steep 
and dangerous places. Wu Sangui advanced from Shuixi and 
occupied Yunnan. Therefore, he knew that silver was produced 
there; he reported that he would suppress Shuixi.14
The wealth and storage accumulated for hundreds 
of years by chieftains all went to Wu Sangui 15through 
fighting in Shuixi regions. Wu Sangui had accumulated 
enough material bases for anti-Qing Dynasty, which also 
made a relatively full preparation for latter uprising. At 
the same time, Wu also paid great attention to recruit and 
train the strong and brave soldiers from Miao people. 
Wu often led them to charge forward in the revolt of 
three feudatories. Sun Wanxiong, the Korean envoy, was 
dispatched by Wu to inquire about the situation in Beijing 
reported to the emperor of Korea:
The gate keepers were asked about the matters by Wu Sangui, 
and they said...he owned a troop of army (i.e. Servants in Miao 
territory) daring not to die. Their teeth are the same color with 
their knees and their eyes are profound and black; they are 
good at employing swords and brave enough to intimidate the 
enemies.16
After approved by Qing court, Wu surrounded 
Chieftain in Manai when other chieftain forces had not 
acted: “He attacked them for over 70 days to break their 
villages and cut down their good omens”17 so as to pacify 
the chieftain in Manai. In 1664, the Qing court ordered 
Wu to dispatch the militants in Yunnan and Guizhou to 
invade Shuixi from east and west. On 28th March 1665 of 
Kangxi period, Wu Sangui reported:
Li Shiyao, general, occupied Shuixi of Wumeng in November; 
An Kun came to occupy on knowing this. Our militants have 
chased to Boluoqing and Faditun, getting An Kun and settling 
the local people.18
On 31st March 1665, Wu Sangui reported that the 
militants and soldiers had  came forward to Wusa and 
arrested chieftains An Zhongsheng and An Zhongqian.19
After pacifying the Shuixi revolt, Wu Sangui continued 
to pacify the revolts by chieftains in Yunnan; and at the 
13 Strategy to Squash the three rebellions book 1, see Imperial 
Collection of Four, Book 354, p. 6.
14 Kang Xi Qi Ju Zhu, p.1972.
15 Liu Jian. Ting Wen Lu, Book 4, Despotism of Separatism Regime.
16 Wu Hanji. Chinese Historical Materials in Li’s Veritable Records 
of North Korea, Book 10, p.4044.
17 Ting Wen Lu, Book 474, Biography of Wu Sangui.
18 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shengzu’s Veritable Records 
Book 14, p.12.
19 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shengzu’s Veritable Records 
Book 14, p.12.
same time, he reported to implement the bureaucratization 
of native officers in Shuixi. On 9th July 1665, the Ministry 
of Official Personal Affairs had ratified it.20 On 6th March 
1666, set the previous place of chieftain An Kun as 
Pingyuan government, Dafang as Dading government, 
Shuixi as Qianxi government and La county as Pingyuan 
county.21 On 11th October 1666, it changed chieftain 
government of Wusa as Weining government, which was 
under the control of Guizhou province.22
Up till then, the bureaucratization of native officials 
in Shuixi regions had basically completed. Wu had 
conducted the initial bureaucratization in Shuixi regions, 
though limited in terms of scale; it indeed eradicated the 
largest chieftain forces in Guizhou, which laid foundation 
for the comprehensive bureaucratization during 
Yongzheng period.
3.  RESUMPTION OF CONCILIATORY 
POLICY IN KANGXI PERIOD
After Kangxi palliating the turmoils, he made great 
policy adjustments to the bureaucratization in southwest 
(including Guizhou) and resumed the conciliatory policy 
to the chieftains in early Qing Dynasty.
On 9th March, 1686, Kangxi released an edict: 
Recently, the governor of Yungui and the inspectors 
of Sichuan and Guangxi all reported to suppress the 
chieftains. I have been considering that it is better to 
pacify them rather than cause trouble.23
There are three reasons for Kangxi to adopt the 
conciliatory policy on Southwestern chieftains:
Firstly, after palliating turmoils and retrieving Taiwan, 
emperor Kangxi mainly focused on north; he had led 
many troops to pacify the activities destroying the 
national unity; the 50 years’ efforts by Yongzheng and 
Qianlong had solved the problems of northern border. 
What’s more, Russia had expanded to the northwestern 
regions in Kangxi period, posing a practical threat to 
realise the boarder stability in Qing Dynasty. Therefore, 
the bureaucratization of native officials in Yunnan and 
Guizhou regions had not been put on the preliminary 
agenda.
Secondly, in late Kangxi period, he was troubled to 
almost demise by the thrones conflicts, which consumed 
much his forces; he was also in bad health, so he had no 
time to manage the chieftain problems in southwestern 
border. Even when the “evading Jungar and saving Tibet” 
20 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shengzu’s Veritable Records 
Book 15, p.15.
21 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shengzu’s Veritable Records 
Book 18, p.7.
22 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shengzu’s Veritable Records 
Book 20, p.3.
23 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shengzu’s Veritable Records 
Book 124, pp.16-17.
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war broke out, Kangxi mainly adopted the conciliatory 
policy in southwestern regions.
Third,  emperor Kangxi had been kind to the 
surrendered subjects and civilians, so did the chieftain 
problem. On 6th January 1683, Cai Yurong, general 
superintend of Yunnan and Guizhou wrote to the emperor:
Han people are not allowed to sell leads, saltpeter and sulfur to 
Yi people. They got the edict: Many chieftains make a living by 
bows and spears; if all these are forbidden, all of them will lose 
sustenance. If the ruler does not love his civilians and maltreat 
them, civilians can also topple him by hand. Nine ministers have 
discussed about this.24 
The political character of Kangxi can be seen from 
the words above. Especially in Kangxi period, Under the 
guidance of “it is better to eradicate a hidden danger rather 
than to do good”, he became accustomed to the current 
situations and adopted the attitudes of understanding and 
tolerance to the social reality, which can be seen from his 
words below:
It is the blessing that this place is in peace. (Kang, Qi, & Zhu, 
1991, January 23)
Of course, adopting the conciliatory policy didn’t mean 
that Kangxi didn’t realize the perils brought by chieftains. 
In order to restrict the expanding chieftain forces, Kangxi 
adopted the methods of segmenting the land and demoting 
the positions, which was the flexible employment of the 
undermining the vassal states, which stipulated that the 
chieftains must: Those ordinary people who are competent 
can apply the officers (second but last level); they can 
administrate these lands, being regarded as one third or 
one fifth of those local officers.25
At the same time, most the military offices and 
institutions containing the unstable factors in Guizhou had 
been incorporated in government offices, magistrates and 
counties,26 further creating conditions were created for in-
depth implementation of the bureaucratization of native 
officers.
4 .   C O M P L E T I O N  O F 
BUREAUCRATIZATION OF NATIVE 
OFFICIALS
During the large-scaled bureaucratization of native 
officials in Yongzheng period, Guizhou also completed 
the political institutions matching the central plains, which 
laid the basic picture of current Guizhou Province.
There are three reasons for this large-scaled, top-
24 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shengzu’s Veritable Records 
Book 106, p.18.
25 Da Qing Hui Dian. Tu Guan, Book 7.
26 (Qianlong) Guizhou History Book 1. (2008). Development 
Inspection of Guizhou Province, reference in Political Geography 
and Social Environment inYunnan and Guizhou Area of Early and 
Middle Qing Dynasty. Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition), (4).
down, comprehensive and radical bureaucratization in 
Yongzheng period.
4.1  The Political Demand For National Politics
In order to achieve this, the nationwide reforms and 
measures like bureaucratization of native officers, sharing 
man taxation into fields and civilians and militants 
working side by side had been fully implemented, 
which also served as the great background for the 
bureaucratization of native officers in Guizhou.
The legitimacy of Yongzheng as an emperor is still a 
topic under much contention. Yongzheng also couldn’t 
dispel it, therefore he wrote a passage to defend himself. 
In early Yongzheng period, the political situations was in 
a turmoil, and Yongzheng needed to contribute to set up 
his authority after wiping out the Nian Gengyao and Long 
Keduo, two obdurate subjects and the insidious 8th prince, 
so he just gave full play to his ambitions and abilities in 
and out of the court.
On 28th January 1727 of Yongzheng period, he released 
an edict to the military department:
For a long time, all chieftains of Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, 
Guangxi and Hubei have done evil at the border and harmed the 
local places; they plunder, contend ad kill each other; the places 
they have embarked on are plagued by their dirty dealings and 
killings. I order you to plan elaborately and bureaucratic the 
local officers. Considering that the poor people at the boarders 
are my people; I want them to get rid of poverty and lead a 
happy and security life. In addition, it is conducive to pioneer 
the abandoned land; and at the same time, it can also increase 
our land.27
Although the truth was not like what Yongzheng had 
said (the suggestions of Ertai were aimed at “increasing 
taxes and pacifying” (Ertai, 1992)), these telling and 
tentative words by him had clearly indicated the initial 
causes for the bureaucratization, in which the political 
factors exceeded the real economic interests.
4.2  Adjustments of Military Strategies
The military threats during Yongzheng period mainly 
came from the northwestern part. Qinghai at early time 
and Jungar at later time experienced turmoils all day long. 
Learn from the historical lessons of Southern Song being 
besieged from Yunnan by people from Mongolia and 
Yuan Dynasty, Yongzheng branched out the army in two 
columns; at the same time, he also adopted the measures 
of bureaucratization for native officials in southwestern 
regions, which was also the strategic military adjustment 
in frontier. After the war of “Expelling Jungar and Saving 
Tibet” in Kangxi Period, Qing Dynasty continued to 
be in a confrontation with  Jungar which was active in 
eastern Qinghai-Tibet Plateau; at the same time, it was 
closely related with Mongolia Shuo, so the southern 
west regions had become the key areas for fighting. With 
27 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizong’s Veritable Records 
Book 64, pp.20-22.
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the development of the war situation in northwest, the 
auxiliary strategic status of the bureaucratization of native 
officials in southwestern regions had changed to the 
important strategic defending regions.
In early Yongzheng period, in order to resume his 
control in Tibet and Qinghai region, Luobuzangdanjin, the 
chieftain of Heshuote Mongolia alluded the surrounding 
tribes to make alliances in the first summer of Yongzheng 
period when changing emperors and General Ying Ti 
came back to capital for the funerals of parents (Wang, 
1989); he had “conspired with Alabutan”28 and dispatched 
many spies to delude29 in marginal Sichuan and Yunnan 
regions. Under this influence, Lama Gedansongzan in 
Zhongdian had plotted with Kukunaoer (Qinghai and 
Shuote Mongolia) and were involved in the revolt. 
Therefore, the boarder defensive situation at West became 
tensed suddenly, leaving southwestern regions the weak 
linkage of the boarder. In order to be initiative and prevent 
the situation like South Song Dynasty, Yongzheng and 
his subjects decided to bureaucratization of the native 
officers. 
4.3  The Political Character Factor Analysis of 
Yongzheng and His Subjects
Emperor Yongzheng was a committed and hardworking 
master, who carried out the reform of eradicating 
the corrupt dealings during his reign. In Yongzheng 
Bibliography, Feng Erkang, the author, pointed out his 
innovative thoughts “rectifying the degenerate atmosphere 
for hundreds of years ”. He regarded the reign of 
Yongzheng in these 13 years as:
He worked diligently every day and cherished all kinds of 
characteristic reform and policies so as to solve the long-
standing maladministration, which had adapted to the 
development requirements to certain extent. All these help to the 
relevant transparent administration, promoting the prosperity 
of national strength, stability of the national political situation 
and the consolidation of multi-national country, thus he is a 
hardworking emperor who makes great contributions to the 
historical development. (Feng, 1985)
Mengsen has made the accounts of the reform 
by Yongzheng in detail, pointing out that: After the 
magnanimous treatment of the previous emperor, all the 
long-standing malpractices, once testified, should be 
eradicated... Among all the diligent emperors, no one can 
compare with Yingzhen.30
However, Yongzheng was very irritable, so Kangxi 
had told him to be “patient and tolerated”. Under the 
dual requirements of political and military situations, 
Yongzheng had implemented the bureaucratization of 
28 Annals of Qing Dynasty History (Yongzheng period), (2000, p.25, 
Beijing: China People’s University Press.
29 A Royal Re-script with Red Ink. Gao Qizhuo Memorials, Book 1, 
transcript preserved in Provincial Library of Guizhou, pp.43-45.
30 Teaching Materials of Ming and Qing Dynasty History (1981) 
Volume 2, Chapter 3. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
native officials as his ambitious political strategies. 
Therefore, the implementation of bureaucratization of 
native officials appeared to be in a rash, especially in 
“opening up Miao boarder” in Guizhou.
E. Ertai, a Juren (a successful candidate in the 
imperial examinations at the provincial level) and 
Xianglanqi people of Manchu, managed the affairs of 
bureaucratization; he worked as the official at jurisdiction 
ministry at the end of Kangxi period, and he was 
known for “being honest and upright as well as astute 
in politics”31, so he was favored by Yongzheng. After 
Yongzheng getting to the throne, E Ertai enjoyed a smooth 
term and often got promoted, so he needed to make some 
achievements to prove himself. Therefore, the political 
characters of Yongzheng and his subjects as well as the 
political situations at that time required them to make 
contributions so as to realize the political ideal of great 
unity.
During the period of Yongzheng, Qing Dynasty, the 
nationwide bureaucratization had been implemented 
in Qing Dynasty, which needed to adopt the strategies 
of “adjust measures according to local conditions” 
and “differential treatment”. To be specific,  the 
bureaucratization of native officials in Guizhou regions 
can be divided into the general flow changing of chieftains 
and opening Miao Territory, in which the latter one stood 
the key point.
4.3.1 General Flow Changing of Chieftains
In early Yongzheng period, there was no general 
chieftain left in Guizhou region, for not only the four 
major chieftains but also many minor ones had been 
bureaucratism to change flows. During the 13 years 
of Yongzheng period, there were over 60 counties 
was reformed in Huguang, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi 
and Guizhou; there were 36 in Huguang and only 7 
Zhou in Guizhou (Zhang, 1980) for the chieftains 
above magistrates. All of them can be referred to Qing 
Chronicles:
On 6th April 1727, the Ministry of War replied after 
discussion:
He Shiji, inspector of Guizhou reported: Xue Shiqian, chieftain 
of Anshun office (belong to Zhenning State) had been dismissed 
for crimes; his son is too young to inherit, so Kangzuo ministry 
is divided into the magistracy of Zhenning State. If asked, just 
follow it.32
On 27th April 1729, Yongzheng ordered Sizhai 
originally managed by chieftains in Zhongcao to be 
controlled by Guiyang government, subordinating to Shen 
Tingzhengqing, inspector of Guizhou.33
On 29th January 1730, Yongzheng changed the area 
31 Rongan, E. et al.: Xiang Qin Bo E Wen Duan Gong Nian Pu.
32 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizong’s Veritable Records 
Book 54, pp.20-21.
33 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizong’s Veritable Records 
Book 79, p.29-30.
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managed by Hongfan chieftain to be controlled by Ding 
Fanzhou, subordinating to Zhang Guangsiqing, inspector 
of Guizhou.34
4.3.2 Pacifying Miao People and Pioneering New Land
“Miao territory in Guizhou” (the contiguous area among 
Hunan, Guangxi and Yunnan ). At the end of Ming 
Dynasty, although there were “construction of castles and 
troops stationing as well as blocking mountains and post 
road to prevent Miao people getting away” (Wang, 1991, 
October) and even “constructing city walls”, it was still 
a problem on how to establish an effective ruling in new 
Miao region. However, the previous “bureaucratization of 
native officers” before Yongzheng had laid the foundation 
for “Miao territory”. Qing government had set up many 
Weisuo near “Miao territory” and pioneered post roads for 
the sake of troops dispatching and delivering food for next 
stage; at the same time, Qing government can also get to 
know about the situations from the bureaucratism ethnic 
groups so as to associate or enlighten them to cooperate 
with the military actions of Qing government. 
“Pioneering Miao territory” was implemented under 
the great background of large scaled bureaucratization of 
native officers; as one of the important links, it deserved 
to serve the general strategic goal of bureaucratization 
at this phase so as to ensure the smoothness of the road 
to Yunnan and Guizhou, which would also change the 
turbulent southwestern regions into the frontier combating 
West Mongolia. In fact, the new Miao territory was just 
located on the south line of main road to Yunnan and 
Guizhou, which directly related to the great situation 
whether Qing can safeguard Yunnan frontier. On the 
problem of pioneering Miao Territory in southeastern 
Guizhou, there had been a hot discussion on “pacifying 
or suppressing”35 in Qing government: there were mainly 
three groups—“suppressing-favored” group represented 
by E Ertai and Zhang Guangsi, “pacifying-favored” group 
represented by Fang Xian (inspector of Zhenyuan officer, 
later promoted to the judicial commissioner of Guizhou) 
and “abandon” group represented by Gao Qizhuo 
(governor of Yunnan and Guizhou) and Zu Bingkui 
(inspector of Guangxi and Guizhou). They had different 
political views in this regard; besides, the corrupt dealings 
and internal infighting had made the overwhelming 
“pioneering Miao Territory” experience twists and turns 
dramatically.
The pioneering of Miao territory in southwestern 
Guizhou can be divided into the following phases: 
Changzhai  War,  Taizhou War and Taigong War. 
This pioneering served as the important part of the 
bureaucratization of native officers in Yongzheng period, 
which mainly aimed at ensure the smoothness of Yunnan-
34 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Shizong’s Veritable Records 
Book 89, p. 21.
35 (Qing) Fang Xian. Ping Miao Ji Lue Tongzhi block-printed edition 
in Wuchang.
Guizhou post road so as to support the attack of West 
Mongolia at frontier; at the same time, it was also the 
political method of Yongzheng to display his merciful 
virtue and ambitions. “Pioneering Miao Territory” didn’t 
calculate the cost accounting, which can be seen form 
the dialogue between Yongzheng and his father with his 
subjects:
In July, next year, E office will reported the pacifying situation 
of new Miao. He got the reply: There should be no haggling 
of their ‘interest’ in the new land; “money and food” shall not 
be spared. Bear in mind that doesn’t make mistakes because of 
trivial interests.36
After twice thinking, I did not manage Miao territory 
for years, so the former Ningji had become futile. I 
have every thought for you and eradicate all those bad 
measures. So there won’t be any harvested land planted 
for civilians in mainland!37
From “no emperor interfering and no controlling” to 
setting official systems, as well as household registration, 
although they represented a kind of social progress, the 
cultural differences between ethic groups can hardly be 
avoided. “Qing military had stationed in Miao territory 
and their daily activities troubled their daily residence.”38 
In particular, building city walls, establishing offices, 
constructing forts and opening post roads had employed 
many Miao people for free; besides, there were all kinds 
of onerous taxation and apportions as well as extortion. 
Miao people could not tolerate this imposed and sudden 
exploitation and suppression, so their rebellious feeling 
kept going high, which finally led to the great revolt by 
Miao people in southeastern Guizhou in 1735 led by 
Baoli, etc..
In February 1735, Lipingrenbaoli had abused his 
power to expropriate money and food, so Miao people 
sought for a chance of revolt. He disseminated the wood 
carving and claimed that he knew magic skills, so a group 
of 20,000 people was soon gathered, occupying Little 
Danjiang and Qingxi, etc.. They defended the officials 
and militants and blocked their way to deliver food. 
Therefore, there was a lack of food in Danjiang, Taigong, 
Qingjiang and Bazhai at the same time. The government 
troops were terror-stricken by the brave Miao people. Ha 
Yuansheng on the west line found that the more militants 
there were, the more they needed to employ. Dong Fang 
on the east line took a watch-and-see attitude and took no 
action. Zhang Zhao, who pacified Miao territory, forewent 
it and retreated back to the mainland. There had been 
a contentious discussions among the subjects: E. Ertai, 
the grand secretary, and Zhang Guangsi, governor of 
36 A Royal Re-script with Red Ink of Yongzheng, Imperial Collection 
of Four edition.
37 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Gaozong’s Veritable 
Records Book 52, pp.14-27.
38 The Archives of Miaomin Insurrection in Early Qing Dynasty 
(1987, the first volume, p.163). Beijing: Guangming Daily Press.
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Huguang wrote to apologize for their bad management 
at that time, and Yongzheng emperor also passed away 
in worry and anger. When Qianlong got to the throne, he 
re-deployed in order to turn the situation; he appointed 
Zhang Guangsi who was familiar with the affairs in Miao 
territory as Jinglv (official position above governor) as 
well as the inspector of Guizhou, fully responding for 
the suppressing in Miao territory. After he got there, he 
adopted double-strategy: suppressing while pacifying; 
disintegrate and demoralize “new Miao” and “old Miao”. 
From June to September, many Miao houses in Taigong, 
Kaili, Qingping, Huangping hand Shibing on both banks 
of Qingshui river had been fired for nothing. The revolt 
by Miao people in southeastern Guizhou had finally been 
put down.
5 .   R E H A B I L I TAT I O N  O F  M I A O 
TERRITORY BY QINGLONG EMPEROR
After pacifying the affairs in Miao territory, Qinglong 
Emperor, adopting the previous experience, proceeded 
with a circumspect attitude and made certain concessions 
to Miao people. On 15th August 1736, Qinglong elucidated 
his general plan for managing Miao territory in one edict:
Zhang Guangsi, governor disseminated the edict and exempt 
the money and food forever in Guzhou.... The customs of Miao 
people are different from those of mainland civilians, so the 
disputes of Miao people are settled by their regulations instead 
of sending to government. The cases involving militants and 
Miao people are dealt with by civil officials or military officers 
in a just way for fear of troubling the local people.39
Qing government allowed the internal disputes of 
the newly developed Miao territory be solved by the 
customary laws of Miao people and exempted them from 
taxation, which was earned by taking a heavy toll of the 
uprisings of Miao people. This had also made Qing rulers 
more aware of the fact that the direct legal control and 
taxation would easily lead to their rebellions. Therefore, 
under the guiding thoughts of safeguarding the social 
stability of the boarder, Qing government had adopted a 
series of special regulations and measures.
Firstly, living with Miao people was forbidden. In 
August 1739, Zhang Guangsi, governor of Guizhou 
reported: If Miao and Han people live together, it may 
lead to bullying.40
In June, 1755, Sun Ying, judicial commissioner of 
Guizhou reported:
The Miao people in new land are simpler than the previous land. 
There all kinds of illicit dealings: traitors, instigations in Miao 
houses, expropriation of Miao land for a long time and seduce 
thefts; any of them happened should be returned to original 
39 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Gaozong’s Veritable 
Records Book 22, pp.20-22.
40 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Gaozong’s Veritable 
Records Book 99, p.36.
places; only in this way can such moth be eradicated  and settle 
Miao people.41 
Secondly, purchasing and establishing were prohibited 
in the new area by Han people.
In April 1750, Ai Bi, inspector of Guizhou, replied: The 
local officers are ordered to scrutinize the Miao houses 
in new land which was only after bureaucratization; Han 
people are forbidden to purchase properties or hide in 
other places. They got the edict: act as discussion result.42
Thirdly, the horse dealers were prohibited to enter the 
Miao boarder.
In June 1751, Kaitai, inspector of Guizhou reported:
The discussion result of today is that three offices: Duyun, 
Liping, Nanlong; 11 halls: Changzhai, Langdai, Bazhai, 
Tiagong, Songtao, Guzhou, Guihua, Danjiang, Dujiang, 
Qingjiang and Shuicheng; three states: Dingfan, Dushan and 
Yongzhou; two counties: Libo and Yongcong; Duyun belonging 
to Duyun county as well Liping belonging to Kaitai county--- 
are all the key regions of Miao territory, so the horse dealing is 
strongly forbidden.43
The implementation of this policy was initially to 
stabilize the border society, which also in fact protected 
the Miao civilians when they exchanged with Han people. 
The special control policy in Miao boarder was historically 
rational at that time. At the end of Qing Dynasty, the 
customary laws of the ethical groups had been in 
continuous conflicts and concord. Although Qianlong 
had exempted Miao territories of money and food as well 
as fully respected their customs, there was mo complete 
implementation; it was a great step of progress to restrain 
heavy exploitation. In order to consolidate the control 
in Miao territory, emperor Qinglong had established 6 
offices (i.e. Bazhai office, Dujiang Office, Danjiang office, 
Qingjiang office, Guzhou office an Taigong officer), on 
the basis of which he also set up “Langdong camp in the 
second year of his reign” and “Xiajiang office” (Ren, 
1987). He did not only support the former chieftains, 
but also resumed the offices of those dismissed ones to 
manage the local affairs. In addition, Qing government 
also dispatched chieftain generals in the area with most 
uprisings of Miao people, or bases, or the ones conflicting 
with Qing army or the dangerous places wiping out Qing 
army. All these generals were the descendants of those 
chieftains who made contributions in suppressing the 
local militants or those who were familiar with the local 
situation of Miao territory, allowing heredity to manage 
the local affairs.
Up till now, the bureaucratization of native officials 
dominated by the central government had basically come 
to an end. Although the bureaucratization of native officers 
41 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Gaozong’s Veritable 
Records Book 689, p.4.
42 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Gaozong’s Veritable 
Records Book 363, pp.30-32.
43 Qing Dynasty Records. Qing Dynasty Gaozong’s Veritable 
Records Book 397, pp.34-35.
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didn’t realize the complete changes of Guizhou region 
into landlord system from chieftain system, there were 
still many old systems constraining the social productivity 
exiting in Guizhou society. For example, “48 systems” 
still exerted a large influence after Shuixi region being 
bureaucratism; the management system of flowing officers 
could not be implemented smoothly, for “chieftains have 
been bureaucratized, but old systems dominate”44. The 
local officers conspired with chieftains to exploit local 
civilians and guests. “Local people all blame for the 
dotted old systems like local rules (Ai, 1992), so there 
are often thefts and homicide”. However, as a main body 
of the system, the chieftain system had withered away. 
Guizhou, the research subject of this paper, had finally 
formed the current political situations with the formation 
of Zunyi office on 3rd September 1728. By the end of 
Qing Dynasty, there were 12 offices in Guizhou: Guiyang, 
Shiqian, Anshun, Xingyi, Dading, Zunyi, Liping, Sinan, 
Sizhou, Zhenyuan, Tongren and Duyun; one Zhili state: 
Pingyue and one Zhili legacy of office: Songtao. Guiyang 
serves as the cap (Niu, 1990).
CONCLUSION 
The bureaucratization of native officers, an objective 
reflection of south and east warding Chinese civilizations, 
represents the top-down and center-marginal expansion 
and strong publication of Han civilization, which 
makes Guizhou region one of the logistical bases of 
China warding off the foreign offenses. It is aimed at 
assimilating cultures and constructing the unified country 
with multiple nationalities (Sun, 2007). The attitude 
responding to this dissemination of the former Chieftain-
dominated regions of Guizhou in the disadvantageous 
development of culture depends on the specific manner 
in implementing the bureaucratization of native 
officers. It is the exchanges, acculturation, conflicts and 
fusions of Han civilizations represented by the central 
government and the civilizations in marginal regions that 
the pluralistic integration patterns of ethnic groups can 
be realized.
Throughout the whole Qing Dynasty, there had been 
great twists and changes of the bureaucratization of native 
officers in Guizhou area—with the changes in military 
and political situations, it had gone through several 
different policy periods of appeasement in Shunzhi period, 
the active flow-changing of Wu Sangui, resumption of 
conciliatory policy in Kangxi period, the comprehensive 
and all-dimensional native officers bureaucratization 
in Yongzheng period and the policy rehabilitation of 
44 (Qing) Huang Zhaizhong. Yu Tu Mu. see Daoguang Da Ding Fu 
Zhi Book 59, Wen Zheng Jiu.
Koreans, Miao nationalities and frontier in Qing Dynasty.
As the important strategic pivot, the policy changes of 
bureaucratization of native officers in Guizhou stands 
for an epitome for the minority policy at boarders under 
the domination of central regime for the great unity, the 
changing reasons of which are not only closely related 
with the objective military and political situations, 
but also related with the ruling styles of the emperors 
themselves. The national strategies of the mainland-
frontier integration of Qing Dynasty were constant; the 
phased policy changes of bureaucratization of native 
officers were only different in manners and measures. It 
is just in this phased changes and gradually forwarding 
process that the bureaucratization of Guizhou realized the 
general goal of matching politics, economics and culture 
with the mainland.
REFERENCES
Ai, B. D. (1992). Knowledge strategy of south Guizhou book 
26, Wei Ning Zhou. Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s 
Press.
Ertai, E. (1992). Memorial to the throne for bureaucratization 
of native officers, Qing Jingshiwenbian (p.2136). Beijing, 
China: Zhonghua Book Company.
Feng, E. K. (1985). Biography of Yongzheng. Beijing: People’s 
Press.
Kang, X., Qi, J., & Zhu, L. (1991, January 23). The 27th year of 
Kangxi. In R. S. Wang (Ed.), Full history of Qing dynasty, 
book 4 (the first version, p.56). Shenyang, China: Liaoning 
People’s Press.
Niu, P. H. (Ed.). (1990). Evolution statements of administrative 
regionalization in Qing dynasty (pp.354-363). Beijing: 
China Cartographic Publishing House.
Ren, K. C. (1987). Guizhou tong zhi: Evolution statements. 
Guiyang, China: Guizhou People’s Press.
Sun, Q. Y. (2007). On the Miao rebellions in Yongzheng-
Qianlong periods and Qianlong-Jiaqing periods from the 
perspective of cultural dissemination. Journal of South-
Central University for Nationalities (Humanities and Social 
Sciences), 27(3).
Wang, Z. C. (1989). Rouyuan records of Qing dynasty (p.57). 
In C. C. Zhao (Ed.). Beijing, China: Zhonghua Book 
Company.
Wang, R. S. (Ed.). (1991, October). Full history of Qing dynasty 
(Book 4, p.318). Shenyang, China: Liaoning People’s Press.
Zhang,  J .  F.  (1980) .  Discuss ion  on  the  progress  o f 
bureaucratization of native officers, essay collections of 
Qing dynasty history (Volume 2). Beijing, China: Zhonghua 
Book Company.
